War & Accountability / Civilian protection
What the evidence establishes about Hamas’s crimes
UN and Human Rights Watch investigations attribute deliberate attacks on civilians and hostage-taking to Hamas’s military wing and other armed groups. A separate UN mission reported evidence of sexual violence during the attacks and captivity. Israeli victims deserve accountability for those responsible.

In June 2024, a United Nations commission concluded that members of Hamas’s military wing and other Palestinian armed groups had intentionally attacked civilians and committed murder on 7 October 2023. A month later, Human Rights Watch concluded that the planned killing and unlawful imprisonment of civilians amounted to crimes against humanity.[1][2]
These findings require sustained attention to the people attacked, the conduct documented and the responsibility of the armed groups involved. Israeli civilians have the same claim to protection as Palestinian civilians. The political cause invoked by an armed organisation cannot remove that protection.
The reports examined here were published in 2024 and concern the attacks and hostage abuses within their stated reporting periods.[1][2][3] Their value is the evidence and reasoning they provide for particular findings. An accurate account should preserve the distinction between an investigated crime, an allegation still requiring evidence and an individual’s criminal responsibility.
The civilian targets matter
The UN commission’s detailed report examined attacks in residential communities, at the Nova music festival and in other civilian locations, as well as an attack on a military outpost. It concluded on reasonable grounds that members of Hamas’s military wing and other armed groups knew that victims were civilians taking no active part in hostilities and nevertheless targeted them.[1]
That finding addresses a central distinction. An assault on military forces and an intentional attack on people in their homes engage different protections. The presence of military targets elsewhere cannot turn every nearby resident, festival attendee or person travelling along a road into a combatant. The commission’s assessment concerns conduct directed at protected people.
Human Rights Watch reached its conclusions through witness interviews and examination of photographs, videos and other material. It found that killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned assault. Its assessment challenges the explanation that civilian atrocities were merely an unintended consequence of a military operation that lost control.[2]
The harm also demands attention at the scale of the individual. A family attacked at home is entitled to an account of who attacked, what happened and who ordered or enabled it. A political argument that reduces its members to representatives of a state erases the very distinction on which civilian protection depends. The people killed were people with lives, relationships and futures.
Hostages are people held under coercion
Taking a civilian to compel another party to act turns that person’s captivity into an instrument of pressure. The UN commission connected its hostage-taking findings with the demands made for prisoner releases. It also documented humiliating and inhumane treatment during abduction.[4] The political purpose of a demand supplies no permission to impose that coercion on a civilian.
The language of an exchange can obscure the act that makes it possible. Negotiations may become necessary to recover captives safely. That practical necessity gives no retrospective legitimacy to their capture or abuse. The person held retains rights throughout the negotiation, irrespective of the value an armed group assigns to their release.
The commission’s findings also show why the categories need care. It examined civilians and soldiers in different circumstances, including soldiers wounded and out of combat. Protection follows the applicable status and conduct. Public argument should identify the person’s circumstances rather than assume that one label decides the legality of every act against them.[1][4]
Attention to hostages should extend to their treatment and the information available to their families. A full account requires evidence about custody, conditions, movement, abuse and death where these occurred. It should identify the relevant captors and decisions with the same care demanded in investigating any other deprivation of liberty.
Sexual violence requires precision and seriousness
The March 2024 report from the mission led by Pramila Patten, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, found reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred during the attacks in at least three locations, including rape and gang rape. It separately reported clear and convincing information that some hostages had experienced sexual violence, including rape and sexualised torture.[3] The mission gathered and verified information; it left attribution to specific armed groups to a full investigation.[3]
The mission also identified allegations that were unfounded and others it could not verify. The mission interviewed released hostages and witnesses to the attacks. Despite efforts to do so, it did not interview a survivor of sexual violence from 7 October itself. It described gaps in forensic evidence and difficulties arising from the circumstances in which bodies were recovered.[3] Its conclusions draw distinctions that an honest account must retain: corroboration of some crimes, rejection of some reports and uncertainty about others.
There is no contradiction in treating documented sexual violence seriously while correcting a false story. Correcting an allegation improves the account of what happened. It cannot logically erase separate evidence concerning another victim or incident. Equally, the existence of substantiated abuse cannot authenticate every account circulated in its aftermath.
Care extends to the victims’ dignity. An article can explain the evidentiary findings without repeating graphic details or identifying people whose privacy the investigators protected. The burden is to describe the conduct accurately and explain the basis for the finding. Sensational detail is a poor substitute for that work.
Test the response against the evidence
Hamas’s own response belongs in the record. In its April 2024 reply published by Human Rights Watch, it maintained that its forces had been instructed to spare civilians and had intended to attack military targets. It attributed the course of events partly to the collapse of Israeli defences, the participation of others and resulting disorder. Human Rights Watch set those explanations against the conduct it documented.[5] The UN mission report also records Hamas’s denial of rape allegations.[3]
Human Rights Watch identified Qassam Brigades fighters in verified footage taking hostages and killing civilians across southern Israel. It used fighters’ headbands and the armed groups’ own published footage and claims to help establish who took part.[2] Those findings give a concrete basis for testing Hamas’s account against its forces’ conduct.
Investigative limitations deserve the same specificity. The UN commission described Israel’s refusal to cooperate and its own lack of access to the sites. It explained its use of remote interviews, submissions and verified open-source material.[6] Those circumstances matter when assessing the strength of a finding. They require examination of how each conclusion was reached, rather than automatic acceptance or dismissal of the whole report.
Criminal proceedings have a further task: determining the responsibility of particular individuals under the applicable legal standards. The published investigations provide material for that work and conclusions that can be scrutinised now. The seriousness of a documented attack does not depend on a commentator being able to announce the result of a future prosecution.
Accountability must follow the act
The strongest political objection is that emphasis on Hamas’s crimes can be used to excuse Israel’s conduct in Gaza. That risk should be answered with a consistent standard. Every party remains answerable for its own decisions. Protecting Palestinian civilians and demanding accountability for attacks on Israeli civilians are obligations that reinforce one another.
The same consistency prevents attribution to a whole population. Evidence concerning Hamas’s military wing, other armed groups or identified participants should attach responsibility to the relevant actors. Palestinian civilians have no collective responsibility for those crimes. Israeli civilians have no collective responsibility for their government’s acts. Civilian protection loses its meaning when either population becomes a substitute defendant.
For Australian public debate, the demand is straightforward: assess the evidence, preserve the distinction between civilians and combatants, and apply the standard to victims whose politics or nationality differ from our own. Disagreement about the conflict’s history can coexist with a clear judgement about deliberately attacking a family or taking a civilian captive.
The investigations supply a serious basis for accountability. Anyone disputing their conclusions should identify the incident, the evidence and the reason. A civilian’s claim to protection cannot depend on whether their suffering serves the argument we prefer.
Evidence & approach
How this argument is tested
The June 2024 UN Commission detailed report, the March 2024 UN sexual-violence verification mission report and Human Rights Watch’s July 2024 investigation and published Hamas reply were compared. Relevant preserved passages were rechecked on 27 October 2026. Findings retain their investigator or mission, threshold, actor, incident and reporting-period limits. The mission did not make findings attributing alleged sexual-violence violations to specific armed groups. The article addresses intentional civilian attacks, hostage-taking, sexual violence and accountability without asserting current hostage totals or the outcome of a criminal prosecution.
The public record
Sources
Numbered in order of first citation. Each external link opens in a new tab to the original publisher’s document or an official reproduction; notes explain what it supports and its limits.
- UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Detailed findings on attacks carried out on and after 7 October 2023 in Israel, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 278–285 and 299
UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Detailed findings on attacks carried out on and after 7 October 2023 in Israel, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 278–285 and 299. Original PDF checked and preserved on 23 October 2026. Findings use the commission’s reasonable-grounds standard; they are investigative assessments, with actor and incident qualifications, rather than individual criminal convictions.
Return to citation ↑ - Human Rights Watch · “I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind”: Palestinian Armed Groups’ October 7 Assault on Israel, 17 July 2024
Human Rights Watch, “I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind”: Palestinian Armed Groups’ October 7 Assault on Israel, 17 July 2024, methodology and summary, printed pp. 4 and 9–12, and full methodology pp. 22–28. Publisher HTML checked; raw publisher downloads blocked. An ecoi.net repository copy of the full report was preserved and checked on 23 October 2026. Findings of planned murder and unlawful imprisonment as crimes against humanity are attributed to HRW; not court convictions or findings against every member of an organisation.
Return to citation ↑ - Office of the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict · Mission report: official visit to Israel and the occupied West Bank, 29 January–14 February 2024, 4 March 2024
Office of the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Mission report: official visit to Israel and the occupied West Bank, 29 January–14 February 2024, 4 March 2024, paragraphs 7–19, 25–27 and 78. Original checked and preserved on 23 October 2026. The findings for attacks and hostages have different scopes and thresholds. Access, forensic limits and rejected allegations are retained. The mission did not draw conclusions attributing alleged violations to specific armed groups; paragraph 78 reserves that task for a full investigation. Its findings address occurrence and evidentiary thresholds, rather than a finding of Hamas command responsibility. No present-day claim about ongoing captivity or abuse is made.
Return to citation ↑ - UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 295–298, read with the circumstances discussed in paragraphs 278–281
UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 295–298, read with the circumstances discussed in paragraphs 278–281. Original checked on 23 October 2026. Hostage-taking and treatment findings are attributed; the article avoids using the report’s historical captivity totals as present-day figures.
Return to citation ↑ - Human Rights Watch · “I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind”, 17 July 2024 · published Hamas reply dated 14 April 2024
Human Rights Watch, “I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind”, 17 July 2024, printed pp. 46–47 and annex, English translation of Hamas’s 14 April 2024 reply, pp. 238 onwards. Repository copy checked on 23 October 2026. Hamas’s assertions are presented as its published response and are not adopted as independent facts; this is not a reply to this article.
Return to citation ↑ - UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 2–12
UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/56/CRP.3, 10 June 2024, paragraphs 2–12. Original checked on 23 October 2026. Records the commission’s methodology, access restrictions and account of non-cooperation; no inference that access restrictions alone prove any allegation.
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Right of reply
No new response request was required for this article. Reviewed .
This article relies on published investigative findings and includes Hamas’s historical response reported by Human Rights Watch and its denial recorded by the UN mission. These were responses to those sources, not to The Alderwick Institute. No new response request was made.
People and organisations discussed in this article can submit a response. Material corrections and relevant responses will be recorded here, with dates and an explanation of any change to the argument.

